Agile Engineering at Skunk Works & Kelly's 14 Rules of Management
Kelly Johnson | SR-71 | U-2
I have recently come across a conference recording from 2017 in which Nickolas Means presented the history behind Skunk Works and their selected projects.
Here is this video, I highly recommend this lecture on engineering (even for those of you living pretty far from the tech world):
Before ‘22, I didn’t know much about Lockheed or Skunk Works in particular. Can’t say the military was of any interest to me prior to this year for obvious reasons.
The presented story is borderline fantastic, especially the part depicting their design challenges related to SR-71 aka Blackbird.
Behind every product/engineering decision there was the meticulous work of 150+ folks busy on that spy plane project (do note - some of the later projects had x times the staff and some of them failed miserably, ‘committees never win races’).
Custom fuel - check.
Custom alloy - check.
Custom ground unit for a starter called ‘Buick’ (2 coupled car engines to crank that plane while on the ground, they couldn’t afford to waste more weight so the engine had to be started ‘externally’ basically like with an old model T.
The entire plane was built from scratch following the agile methods using the bare minimums of resources and time. All that having 150 folks busy on the project in total secrecy imposed by the CIA.
That’s very impressive for a plane that was able to cruise at 3.5 times the speed of light while taking pictures of secret soviet bases. Mind you, we talk about the early 60s here.
Impressive and fascinating product-wise.
How come this little sub-kingdom of Lockheed was able to produce such a number of great planes on a budget when everyone else was overrunning budgets on a weekly basis?
I bought 2 books to find out for myself:
While I am still finishing Ben R.’s take on F-117 I would like to share some of Kelly’s (Kelly Johnson, Skunk’s father) citations on their early methods of product discovery & MVPs.
First, I’d like to share his 14 rules on engineering & product management:
1. The Skunk Works manager must be delegated practically complete control of his program in all aspects. He should report to a division president or higher.
2. Strong but small project offices must be provided both by the military and industry.
3. The number of people having any connection with the project must be restricted in an almost vicious manner. Use a small number of good people (10% to 25% compared to the so-called normal systems).
4. A very simple drawing and drawing release system with great flexibility for making changes must be provided.
5. There must be a minimum number of reports required, but important work must be recorded thoroughly.
6. There must be a monthly cost review covering not only what has been spent and committed but also projected costs to the conclusion of the program.
7. The contractor must be delegated and must assume more than normal responsibility to get good vendor bids for subcontract on the project. Commercial bid procedures are very often better than military ones.
8. The inspection system as currently used by the Skunk Works, which has been approved by both the Air Force and Navy, meets the intent of existing military requirements and should be used on new projects. Push more basic inspection responsibility back to subcontractors and vendors. Don't duplicate so much inspection.
9. The contractor must be delegated the authority to test his final product in flight. He can and must test it in the initial stages. If he doesn't, he rapidly loses his competency to design other vehicles.
10. The specifications applying to the hardware must be agreed to well in advance of contracting. The Skunk Works practice of having a specification section stating clearly which important military specification items will not knowingly be complied with and reasons therefore is highly recommended.
11. Funding a program must be timely so that the contractor doesn't have to keep running to the bank to support government projects.
12. There must be mutual trust between the military project organization and the contractor, the very close cooperation and liaison on a day-to-day basis. This cuts down misunderstanding and correspondence to an absolute minimum.
13. Access by outsiders to the project and its personnel must be strictly controlled by appropriate security measures.
14. Because only a few people will be used in engineering and most other areas, ways must be provided to reward good performance by pay not based on the number of personnel supervised.
Source:
https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/who-we-are/business-areas/aeronautics/skunkworks/kelly-14-rules.html
I won’t get into much commenting here - the video above explains pretty much everything.
As a finishing touch, I’d like to share a couple of quotes/pictures with my personal favorites. Those depict the level of thinking these guys lived on a constant basis.
While everything was hand-sketched and there was no computer to run the necessary calculations, the majority was done thoroughly on paper by the selected view. Not to mention, the level of observability and error logging was nearly perfect:
One thing we learned in manufacturing the first Oxcart airplane was not to trust color coding. I had insisted on color codes for all wires and tubes and other connections, so that plumbing and other systems could not be installed incorrectly. Working with that many people, we discovered that ten per cent were color blind. We've found a part bent over four inches to be connected incorrectly. We still color code, but we also use odd-shaped terminals that will fit only one way for those who can't distinguish colors. Materials and manufacturing were only part of the problem.
2.
"If you can't do it with brainpower, you can't do it with manpower-overtime," is axiomatic with me. Our aim is to get results cheaper, sooner, and better through application of common sense to tough problems. If it works, don't fix it. "Keep it simple, stupid"- KISS - is our constant reminder. "Be quick, be quiet, be on time," is another of our mottos. "Listen; you'll never learn anything by talking. The measure of an intelligent person is the ability to change his mind." These concepts save time, money, and people.
3.
We found that the spotwelds on the wing panels failed very early in their test life when we built the panels in the summer, but if they were built in the winter they would last indefinitely. Analyzing all the processes, we discovered that in summer the water supply system for the city of Burbank was loaded with chlorine to reduce algae. When we washed the welds with pure water, there was no problem.
4.
We had to train thousands of people, not only our own, but Air Force mechanics and employees of our subcontractors - more than 300 - in how to handle the machined parts. It's difficult to get an old-time machinist to change his ways. He wants to discover on his own how to do something so in the Skunk Works we put them in the experimental shop under the engineers' direction and made them a party to developing the data. That always is a good tactic: involve the employee in the whole program as much as possible to arouse his interest and inspire his best performance
I am deeply impressed by the level of engagement among those early engineers. No matter the stress and secrecy they were able to collect feedback, test and build prototypes on a budget when only a dozen of people even knew about the project.
It makes me laugh when PMs moan about their TA’s inaccessability.
There is definitely a way if F-117, build from spare parts and glue, made its way to the dusty horizon of Baghdad.